General Principles	
	<ul> <li>Goal in statutes: legislative intent. Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger (Tex. 2012)</li> <li>normally derived from the text. Texas Student Hous. Auth. v. Brazos Cnty. Appr. Dist. (Tex. 2015)</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Goal in contracts: parties' intent. Plains Explor'n &amp; Prod. Co. v. Torch Energy Advisors Inc. (Tex. 2015)</li> <li>objective intent, not subjective intent. In re Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc. (Tex. 2006)</li> <li>measured at time of contracting. FPL Energy, LLC v. TXU Portfolio Mgmt. Co., LP (Tex. 2014)</li> </ul>
	<b>Purpose stated in statute</b> . Gov't Code § 311.023(1); RRC v. Tex. Citizens for Safe Future (Tex. 2011)
	Plain meaning. Life Partners, Inc. v. Arnold (Tex. 2015); Plains Exploration v. Torch Energy (Tex. 2015)
	No part meaningless. Entergy Gulf States v. Summers (Tex. 2009); Plains Expl. v. Torch Energy (Tex. 2015)
	<b>Consequences</b> . Govt Code § 311.023(5); Texas Student Hous. Auth. v. Brazos Cty. App. Dist. (Tex. 2015)
	Absurdity. avoid absurd results. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Glyn-Jones (Tex. 1994)
	Cannot rewrite statute/contract. Iliff v. Iliff (Tex. 2010); Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds (Tex. 2006)
	Freedom of contract. Moayedi v. Interstate 35/Chisam Rd., L.P. (Tex. 2014)
	Enforcement is sacred. Fairfield Ins. Co. v. Stephens Martin Paving, LP (Tex. 2008)

Definitions	
	<ul> <li>Defined terms. Use that definition. Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Gentilello (Tex. 2013)</li> <li>unless context suggests otherwise. In re Ford Motor Co. (Tex. 2014)</li> </ul>
	• caveat: definition in one chapter may not apply to others. <i>Texas Dept. Ins. v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co.</i> ( <i>Tex. 2012</i> ); Matagorda County Appraisal Dist. v. Coastal Liquids Partners, L.P. (Tex. 2005)
	<ul> <li>Undefined terms. Use generally accepted meaning. Govt. C § 312.002; SORM v. Cart (Tex. 2014)</li> <li>consider dictionaries. Zachry Const. Corp. v. Port of Houston Auth. of Harris County (Tex. 2014)</li> <li>consider treatises &amp; Restatement. Jaster v. Comet II Const., Inc. (Tex. 2014)</li> <li>harmonize with other usages in statute. In re Mem'l Hermann Hosp. Sys. (Tex. 2015)</li> </ul>
	Repeated terms. Construe consistently throughout statute. City of Lorena v. BMTP Holdings (Tex. 2013)
	Terms with multiple meanings. Look to context. Beeman v. Livingston (Tex. 2015)
	<ul> <li>Custom &amp; usage. Use industry terms or technical meaning parties intended. Govt Code § 311.011(b)</li> <li>exception: can't alter unambiguous contract. Kachina Pipeline Co., Inc. v. Lillis (Tex. 2015)</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Common grammar rules apply. Govt Code § 311.011(a); Marks v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp. (Tex. 2010)</li> <li>but remember the "Semicolon Court." Ex parte Rodriguez (Tex. 1874)</li> </ul>

Context	
	Context. Can't divorce text from context. In re Office of Atty. General (Tex. 2015); Zanchi v. Lane (Tex. 2013)
	Surrounding circumstances. Sun Oil Co. (Delaware) v. Madeley (Tex. 1981)
	<b>Construe as whole, harmonize to give effect to all</b> . FPL Energy, LLC v. TXU Portfolio Mgmt. Co. (Tex. 2014)

Context	
	Construe contemporaneous contracts/statutes together. In re Laibe Corp. (Tex. 2010); Mid-American Indem. v. King (Tex. 1995)
	Construe complementary statutes together. POM Wonderful, LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., Inc. (US 2014)
	<ul> <li>Uniformity with other laws/states. Govt Code § 311.028; Nathan v. Whittington (Tex. 2013)</li> <li>exception: nonstandard contracts/laws. RSUI Indem. Co. v. The Lynd Co. (Tex. 2015)</li> </ul>
	Utilitarian view. Consider business activity involved. Frost Nat. Bank v. L & F Distributors, Ltd. (Tex. 2005)
	No surplusage. Give meaning to every word so none rendered surplusage. Govt Code § 311.021(2); Ewing Const. Co. v. Amerisure Ins. Co. (Tex. 2014); Kallinen v. City of Houston (Tex. 2015)
	<b>Duplicative provisions.</b> Sometimes included for caution or emphasis. In re City of Georgetown (Tex. 2001)
	Legislative history. Irrelevant unless statute is ambiguous. Sullivan v. Abraham (Tex. 2016)
	<ul> <li>court may consider whether ambiguous or not. Govt Code § 311.023</li> </ul>
	Extrinsic evidence. Admissible only if contract ambiguous. Gallagher HQ v. City of San Antonio (Tex.
	2010)

Conf	Conflicts	
	<ul> <li>Specific terms prevail over general. Govt Code 311.026(b)</li> <li>only if can't be reconciled. Texas Indus. Energy Consumers v. CenterPoint Energy Houston (Tex. 2010)</li> <li>only between laws of equal dignity. Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard (US 2012)</li> </ul>	
	Handwritten/typed prevail over printed. Bus. & Com. Code § 3.114	
	Express v. incorporated provisions. Express provisions prevail. Americo Life, Inc. v. Myer (Tex. 2014)	
	Conflicting statute and common law. Did Legislature intent to override. Dugger v. Arredondo (Tex. 2013)	
	Conflicting statute and court rule. Most recent prevails. Gov't Code § 22.004; Jackson v. SOAH (Tex. 2011)	
	Earlier in contract. Early terms favored over subsequent ones. Coker v. Coker (Tex. 1983)	
	Later in session. Latest enactment prevails. Govt Code § 311.025; In re Mem'l Hermann Hosp. Sys. (Tex. 2015); Jackson v. SOAH (Tex. 2011)	
	<b>Comprehensive statutory scheme.</b> Courts refrain from imposing additional claims/procedures. <i>Ritchie v.</i> <i>Rupe (Tex. 2014); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Adcock (Tex. 2013)</i>	
	Notwithstanding any other Makes term superior. G.T. Leach Builders, LLC v. Sapphire V.P., LP (Tex. 2015)	

Siler	Silence	
	<ul> <li>Silence. Presumed to be purposeful, deliberate choice. <i>Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger</i> (Tex. 2012)</li> <li><i>but</i> may be a mistake, lack of consensus, delegation to courts or agencies, or intent to avoid repetition. <i>PPG Indus., Inc. v. JMB/Houston Ctrs. Partners Ltd. P'ship (Tex. 2004)</i></li> </ul>	
	Absence. Lack of limits used elsewhere may mean unlimited. City of Dallas v. TCI West End (Tex. 2015)	
	Negative inference. Limits on claim don't indicate approval of it. Tex. Mut. Ins. v. Ruttiger (Tex. 2012)	

Silence	
Fallacy of the inverse. That P implies Q does not mean not-P implies not-Q. NLRB v. Canning, (US 2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting)	
Editing	
<ul> <li>Headings &amp; titles. Can consider, but can't expand or limit statute. Govt Code §§ 311.023(7), 311.024; Damuth v. Trinity Valley Community College (Tex. 2014)</li> <li>less weight than text. RSUI Indem. v. Lynd Co. (Tex. 2015); City of Dallas v. TCI West End (Tex. 2015)</li> </ul>	
Last-antecedent rule.         Qualifier usually modifies only nearest item.         Sullivan v. Abraham (Tex. 2016)	
Series-qualifier rule. Qualifier modifies all items in parallel construction. Sullivan v. Abraham (Tex. 2016)	
<b>Changes in draft forms.</b> Given great weight. <i>Houston Explor. Co. v. Wellington Underwr. (Tex. 2011)</i>	
Changes in draft statutes. Usually disregarded. Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger (Tex. 2012)	
Punctuation.       Punctuation aids construction.       Criswell v. European Crossroads Shopping Ctr., Ltd (Tex. 1990)         • absence of comma was drafting error.       In re Deepwater Horizon (Tex. 2015)	
Repeal. May not indicate prior constructions were wrong. AHF Arbors v. Walker County (Tex. 2011)	

Agen	Agency Interpretation	
	<ul> <li>Deference to agency.</li> <li>only if statute ambiguous. Boeing Co. v. Paxton, 466 S.W.3d 831, 838 (Tex. 2015)</li> <li>only if from formal proceedings. Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds (Tex. 2006)</li> <li>only if within statutory authority. Texas Lottery Comm'n v. First State Bank of DeQueen (Tex. 2010)</li> <li>only if reasonable and consistent with plain language. Thompson v. Tex. Dept. of Licensing &amp; Regulation (Tex. 2014)</li> </ul>	
	More deference. Interpretation accepted by Legislature. RRC v. Tex. Citizens for a Safe Future (Tex. 2011)	
	Less deference. Legislative intent rather than technical/regulatory issues. In re Smith (Tex. 2011)	
	Executive officials. May be entitled to deference too. In re Smith (Tex. 2011)	

Pres	Presumptions	
	Knowledge of law. Parties presumed to know law. Greater Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips (Tex. 1990)	
	Knowledge of contract. Parties presumed to know terms. Nat'l Prop. Hldgs. v. Westergren (Tex. 2015)	
	Parties contract only for themselves. Basic Cap. Mgmt., Inc. v. Dynex Commercial (Tex. 2011)	
	Legislature knows caselaw. Abutahoun v. Dow Chem Co. (Tex. 2015); Dugger v. Arredondo (Tex. 2013)	
	<ul> <li>Constitutionality intended. Govt. C § 311.021(1); In re Allcat Claims Serv., L.P. (Tex. 2011)</li> <li>construe to avoid constitutional problems. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (US 2011); ERS v. Duenez (Tex. 2009)</li> </ul>	

Presumptions	
	<b>Retroactivity.</b> Laws presumed prospective only. <i>Govt. C § 311.022; City of Austin v. Whittington (Tex. 2012)</i>
	Extraterritoriality. None presumed unless intent clear. Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co. (Tex. 2006)
	Governmental immunity. Not waived unless clearly stated. Gov't Code § 311.034

Specific Words	
	Any: Can mean every. Kirby Lake Dev., Ltd. v. Clear Lake City Water Auth. (Tex. 2010)
	May: Can be mandatory. Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Const. Co. (US 2000)
	• can mean permission rather than option. <i>Govt Code § 311.016; Ray Malooly Trust v. Juhl (Tex. 2006)</i>
	Includes. Doesn't exclude items not stated. Govt Code § 311.005(13); Sneed v. Webre (Tex. 2015)
	Or: Indicates separate and distinct items. City of Lorena v. BMTP Holdings, L.P. (Tex. 2013)
	Shall: Mandatory unless legislative intent otherwise. Govt Code § 311.016(2)
	The: Can mean more than one. PlainsCapital Bank v. Martin (Tex. 2015)

Latin Class	
	<ul> <li>Cessante ratione legis cessat et ipsa lex.</li> <li>when reason of the law ceases, the law also ceases. LAN/STV v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. (Tex. 2014)</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Contra proferentem. Construe against drafter. In re Deepwater Horizon (Tex. 2015)</li> <li>only if &gt; 1 reasonable interpretation. Evanston Ins. Co. v. ATOFINA Petrochemicals (Tex. 2008)</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Ejusdem generis. Naming some implies exclusion of others. Brooks v. Northglen Ass'n (Tex. 2004)</li> <li>general terms limited to categories like those expressed. City of Houston v. Bates (Tex. 2013)</li> <li>intended for "catchall" clauses. Paroline v. U.S. (US 2014)</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.</li> <li>stating one excludes others. Brooks v. Northglen Ass'n, 141 S.W.3d 158, 168 (Tex. 2004)</li> <li>Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. Including one excludes others. City of Houston v. Williams (Tex. 2011)</li> <li>only if context indicates intent rather than inadvertence. Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co. (US 2003)</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Generalia specialibus non derogant.</li> <li>specific governs general. Govt Code 311.026(b); In re Mem'l Hermann Hosp. Sys. (Tex. 2015)</li> <li>applies only to laws of equal dignity. Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard (US 2012)</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Noscitur a sociis. Words grouped together given related meaning. <i>Ritchie v. Rupe (Tex. 2014)</i></li> <li>N/A if list is too short and items too disparate. <i>Graham County v. U.S. (US 2010)</i></li> </ul>

Quotable	
	"If it were proved by 20 bishops that a party, when he used words, intended something else than the usual meaning the law imposes, he would still be held." <i>Hotchkiss v. Nat'l City Bank (SDNY 1911)</i>
	"If Parliament does not mean what it says, it must say so." In re Jorden (Tex. 2008)

"The Court risks being viewed as a contest among Pharisees in the Temple of Textualism over who is the most devout." Jaster v. Comet II Constr., Inc. (Tex. 2014) (Hecht dissent)
"Since the Tower of Babel, expression is inexact." Jaster v. Comet II Constr. (Tex. 2014) (Hecht dissent)
"Making life easy for judges is not a rule of contract construction." Intercont'l Group P'ship v. KB Home Lone Star L.P. (Tex. 2009) (Brister dissent)